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Abstract. This article provides a theoretical analysis from which a space security expert could appreciate
the complexity and richness of the space security challenge.
It was always nonsense. The idea that the end of the Cold War would bring with it an end of history—
i.e., an end of contestation of what entailed the ends of life and the means to get there—could only be
nonsense. For even if all people or even just the people who cared about such things could have agreed
about ends and means, the devil would still be in the details. And so after the Cold War (as during and
before it) one finds followers of the Book—be it the Christian Bible, the Koran, the United States (US)
Constitution, a novella, an infinitely looped aphorism, or some other secular or sacred revelation burned
within the soul or on some bonfire—involved in struggles comprising problematic behaviors
encompassing real and perceived betrayal, violation of trust, and violence begetting ever more of the
same.
In at least two ways, these problematic behaviors certainly are not nonsense. First, any nonsense is not
devoid of sense but has meaning as something devoid of sense. In this manner, anything labeled
nonsense immediately is hoisted on its own semantic petard and is probably still helpful in a search for
either Truth or truth. It is thus that this very chapter’s beginning that ascribes the notion of the end of
history in the context of the end of the Cold War as nonsense has sense.
Second, and more specifically, these problematic behaviors have had all the trappings of sense in that
they are imbued with human intentions, goals, passions, and the like—often the hottest elements of
human psychology. They also seem to have been omnipresent throughout human history and deadly
serious to actor and/or target. A complicating feature, however, is that the trappings of sense may not
make sense or only make the wrong sense to those who do not espouse the trappings as self-compatible
or as morally, ethically, and even epistemologically and metaphysically relevant.
The most significant problematic behaviors facing the space security expert are sabotage, espionage,
and terrorism. For the purpose of this chapter, sabotage denotes any action—including intrapsychic
acts of nonattention, misattention, and attendant mental processes—that is intentionally taken to
impede the success of some other action. This other action may be also one taken by the saboteur,
some other person or people, some other living organism, or some materiel or apparatus. Purposeful
miswriting of computer code, enraged destruction of computer hardware, devious and covert distortion
of text, intentional misstatements, and unauthorized hacking into computer systems can be a few
examples of sabotage.
Espionage denotes the intentional obtaining of information by someone without authorization for
obtaining it or the intentional transmittal of said information to someone without authorization to
obtain it. The Issue of authorization is complex because it usually involves both formal possession of a
security clearance or some sort of special access and a validated need-to-know based on the formally
prescribed and proscribed duties of someone and the requirements of projects for which this someone
is at least partially responsible. Examples of espionage can include intentionally providing classified,
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sensitive, or proprietary information to a representative of an organization that is adversarial or
competitive to that which one represents. In the world of space security, one may not need to
physically possess such information at all but merely to engage in behavior—e.g., through the sabotage
of disabling a cyber firewall—enabling someone else to inappropriately access data.
Terrorism denotes the use of violence and/or its threat against noncombatants or noncombatantoriented materiel or equipment employed by noncombatants to achieve a political objective. The
construct of noncombatant is a highly complex and controversial one and is often equated with being
innocent and unjustly targeted by terrorism . In eyes of various beholders the construct may denote
uniformed soldiers who are militarily surprised; soldiers in mufti who are off-duty; civilian functionaries
and representatives of governments; other civilians providing financial or emotional support to an
adversary, civilians who pay taxes to an adversarial entity; or, indeed, very young children and very old
adults who could in any possible way be construed to be able to support counterterrorism in the past,
present, or future. In essence, there are no innocents and, thus, there may be no terrorism, because the
latter cannot be reliably differentiated from various military, law enforcement, and even business and
social control acts of coercion. Assuming there is a viable construct of terrorism, however, one example
might be the threat of blowing up a space communications satellite in orbit for the purpose of
generating panic among a general public and then a behavioral capitulation on the part of a government
that formally represents that general public and controls the satellite.
What is so egregious about the three interrelated problematic behaviors of sabotage, espionage, and
terrorism is that they often subvert what may be the two most basic classes of distinctions that
undergird psychological constructions of human securities and insecurities. One class comprises the
distinctions between the me and not me, inside one’s self and outside one’s self, self and other, and,
ultimately, us and them. The other class comprises the distinctions between pleasure and pain, good
and bad, and the desired and undesired. Together, the two classes may combine to undergird
constructions of the known self and alien other, ingroup and outgroup, and, ultimately, ally and enemy.
The horror from the flash of realization that one’s body is a host of malignant tIssue, that one’s mind is
being controlled by others (in certain cases labeled as examples of psychopathology), or that a
colleague or ally watching one’s back is holding a figurative or literal knife to it—the ultimate fear of the
space security expert—may defy adequate description through language. Suffice it to say that at that
moment one’s very world seems to implode with every bit the intensity of a communications asset
exploding.
This phenomenological sense of world implosion—along with the possibility of actual physical
destruction—is a cardinal feature of the three problematic behaviors of sabotage, espionage, and
terrorism that are described above. This is even more the case in the context of space security, because
space-based communications has already formed in many parts of the world--and are increasingly
becoming in yet other parts--the essential infrastructure of many essential features of life. The
conscious and unconscious fear of infrastructure becoming extrastructure may have something to do
with the richly detailed history of human response (especially the official response of government and
other formal organizations) to the three problematic behaviors—a response too often characterized by
overreaction, nonadaptive bias, malignant egoistic strivings, and plain stupidity. Three such examples in
the last 100 years involving United States history include the mass internment of loyal JapaneseAmericans during World War II, the McCarthyite Red Scare soon after the advent of the Cold War, and
the writing and initial implementation of the Aviation Security and Transportation Act of 2001.
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But a much more mundane but equally egregious example involves the psychopathology of everyday life
wherein constructs such as emotionally disturbed, unreliable, and treasonous are instinctively applied as
negative stereotypes towards entire groups of people. Other individuals and other groups becoming
aware of the negative stereotyping may, then, be confronted with three basic choices. One choice is to
pile on and engage in the same sorts of thoughts, emotions, motives, and behaviors. A second choice is
to avoid the targeted out-individual or out-group—most often because of not wanting to be “outed” as
well through other-perceived association with those already outed or not wanting to be a victim of
“collateral damage.” A third choice is to engage with the outed in solidarity—perhaps to demonstrate
human solidarity or humanistic resistance to what is not humane.
Some space security experts and many members of space organizations opt for the second choice and
refuse to support the selection of members of an out-group into a space organization, allow their entry
only with difficulty, or induce an environment intended to influence an already selected member of the
out-group to leave the organization. These actions—taken with the full intention of supporting
security—much more likely harm security through reinforcing the sense of “outness” among members
of the out-group. This, of course, plays into the hands of terrorism.
This same negative stereotyping as a social phenomenon seems fairly consistent with the psychological
nexus fueling the history of crimes against humanity. (Erickson, 1999; Heinz, 1995; Laqueur, 1987; Lindy
& Lifton, 2001; Weine, 1999). That this history and the posited psychological nexus still seem to
characterize human behavior may possibly suggest an evolutionary advantage to be exploited for
different reasons by both terrorists and those who seek to extricate themselves from a world of
terrorism to one without it. Unfortunately, this last group only facilitates ensuring that there is no such
latter world.
To their credit, other experts in security realize the present state of affairs and are collaborating on
policies, legislation, and programs to prudently prevent, minimize, and manage sabotage, espionage,
and terrorism. Their main focus is on necessary technological prophylaxis—e.g., biometric identification
checkpoints and explosive detection systems—organizational creation and modification, and reactive
crisis management. However, as these innovations continue to be developed, the human element
fueling problematic behavior—e.g., sabotage, espionage, and terrorism—seems to be given short shrift.
As an example, organizational creation and modification have been significant as security responses in
the post-9/11 environment—a semiotic that ineluctably stimulates the unconscious transfer of
undesired elements of oneself from oneself to some intrapsychic terrorist schema, differential
contamination of cognition by affect, the corporate lust to make a buck, and naked strivings for selfadvancement—that converged on a public discourse focused on what a new cabinet-level Department
of Homeland Security would look like. Advocacy and dialectic focused on which security-related
agencies should be in the Department and which should be out. Organizational questions abounded as
to the identity of the first Department secretary, the size of the budget, and the actual costs of
reorganization of government. Other Issues comprised the quest for corporate liability for divulging
sensitive, security-related information to the Government; the protection or lack thereof of labor rules
for Department personnel; and the ease of money transfers among Department agencies.
One could make a strong case, however, that a new Department would do little to significantly advance
US homeland security and could even threaten it through a misallocation of resources (Smithson, 2002).
This is because the homeland security initiatives that needed to happen, such as more cooperation
between law enforcement and intelligence entities; facilitation of accurate, responsive, and secure
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information transmission from intelligence collectors to operational security authorities; upgrading of an
intelligence analytic fusion center; delineation of more appropriate public safety and public health
guidelines; development and implementation of novel education and training modules concerning
emergency and crisis management; and construction of a more integrated first-responder capability
were not being impeded by existing governmental infrastructure. And organizational creation and
modification maintained and even aroused the common impediments to problem resolution typified by
political turf battles, personality conflicts, the fear of change, and so on.
In fact, the new Department initiative was largely a political tactic to seize partisan electoral advantage,
a well-meaning but flawed attempt to reassure the general public, and an exemplification of magical
thinking about bureaucratic innovation as a show of resolve and muscle that spontaneously transfigures
into operational savvy eliciting despair in US terrorist adversaries (cf. Grote, 2002; Lewis & Considine,
1999; Oliver, 2000). This psychology has been and will surely be exploited by terrorist and other
enemies of the US—both foreign and domestic.
In essence, then, a psychology of crisis response through organizational creation and modification
largely exacerbated the probability of further crisis. Although the US has often exemplified the zenith of
organizational success, this time its organizational penchant rivaled egregious self-injurious behavior
that fosters a security department but not security. One might make an argument by analogy to the
recent announcement of the creation of a new National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Engineering and Safety Center (Leary, 2003) in response to the Columbia space shuttle disaster and
investigation.
The moral of the story is that without a viable approach for selecting, evaluating, and managing the
people who work on space, space communications, and space security Issues, impending perpetrators of
sabotage, espionage, and terrorism may only be aided in their malevolent quests. However, it is
fervently believed by many psychology experts that most problematic behaviors can be best addressed
by understanding people—through something called personality—and by constructing a space security
program focused on the human element—through something called personnel security. A future Issue
of IBPP will turn to these matters in the context of space security. (See Erickson, E.J., Jr. (August, 1999).
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